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THE PRIVATE ROLE IN PUBLIC FRACTURING DISCLOSURE AND 
REGULATION  
 
Hannah J. Wiseman * 
    
Abstract: Recent domestic growth in oil and gas natural gas production 
from shales and sandstones called “tight” formations—largely enabled by 
a modified technology called slickwater hydraulic fracturing—has driven 
both economic growth and environmental concerns. Public concerns have 
often focused on the chemicals used in the fracturing process, yet federal 
regulations requiring disclosure of chemicals are weak. In the midst of 
initial “threats” of federal intervention, industry—along with state 
regulators—developed a website that enabled chemical disclosure. State 
regulations later mandated disclosure through this website, or allowed it as 
one option within a mandatory disclosure regime. Independently, gas 
companies also have begun to experiment with less toxic fracturing 
chemicals and to take other substantive efforts toward identifying and 
limiting the risks of tight oil and gas development. This example of a 
public-private effort to enhance informational access in fracturing, and to 
make limited substantive changes, may offer important lessons for other oil 
and gas regulation moving forward. Agencies and policymakers must make 
independent assessments of risks and avoid directly adopting industry 
solutions if those solutions are incomplete or avoid needed change. But oil 
and gas operators have shown how public action, combined with industry 
coordination and innovation, can sometimes inspire productive responses 
to the risks of unconventional oil and gas production. 
 
 
                                                
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. J.D., Yale Law School, A.B., 
Dartmouth College. Professor Wiseman’s research explores the role of changing regulation and 
regulatory strategies in protecting the character of living spaces and environmental quality, from the sub-
local to the national level. 
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Introduction  
As 2012 drew to a close, the International Energy Agency declared that the United 
States had experienced a “renaissance” in energy.1 Indeed, while we have long relied on 
imports to fulfill many of our energy needs, recent expansions of drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing technologies have opened up large reserves of oil and gas in shales and other 
“tight,” densely packed formations underground, including sandstones. Becoming a 
major global supplier of oil and gas will have important economic, and some 
environmental, benefits for the United States, and potentially for the world; natural gas 
releases fewer conventional air pollutant emissions and greenhouse gas emissions than 
coal or oil, for example.2 Yet domestic abundance of fuels also raises substantial 
concerns, including worries that gas will displace investments in the renewable 
technologies necessary to solve climate problems,3 and that widespread extraction will 
cause environmental contamination.4 Much of the initial public concern has focused on 
the chemicals used in fracturing and associated contamination risk.5 Yet few federal 
environmental laws require disclosure of these chemicals in a manner accessible to the 
public.6 Chemical use is not the only environmental concern associated with drilling and 
fracturing—indeed, it may be far from the largest concern.7 But the potential for 
                                                
1 INT’L. ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 74 (2012), available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/error/authentication;jsessionid=hffgs367hw43.x-oecd-live-01 (not accessible by the public 
without payment; on file with author).  
2 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS 1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS 53 fig.22 (1999), 
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/natural_gas_1998_issues_trends/pdf/it
98.pdf. The extent of greenhouse gas emissions reductions is debated. however, in light of potent methane 
emissions from natural gas. See Mark Fulton et al., Worldwatch Institute, Comparing Life-Cycle 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Natural Gas and Coal 3 (Aug. 25, 2011), 
http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/pdf/Natural_Gas_LCA_Update_082511.pdf (comparing 
lifecycle assessments).  
3 See, e.g., cf. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ARE WE ENTERING A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS 8–
9 (2011), available at 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2011/WEO2011_GoldenAgeofGasReport.pdf 
(noting that with a rise in global natural gas use through 2035, global carbon dioxide emissions would 
still rise and that problematic warming would likely occur); Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed, Get It Right on 
Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/opinion/sunday/friedman-get-it-
right-on-gas.html (quoting Faith Birol, Chief Economist, International Energy Agency) (“[A] golden age 
for gas is not necessarily a golden age for the climate’—if natural gas ends up sinking renewables.”). 
4 See, e.g., Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Associated with Natural Gas 
Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 1382, 1384 (2011), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01757.x/pdf (estimating potentially large 
quantities of surface spills of contaminants as a result of drilling and fracturing in the Marcellus Shale). 
5 See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017104 (describing 
concerns expressed by members of Congress, scientists, and citizens).   
6 See infra note 15 and accompanying text.  
7 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 5 (discussing potential risks based on recent violations at well sites 
 
 
 
PRIVATE ROLE IN PUBLIC FRACTURING DISCLOSURE VOLUME 3 
 
 
            
 51 
chemicals to spill while being transported to well sites or mixed with fracturing 
chemicals,8 or for fracturing wastewater to be improperly treated prior to disposal,9 
makes knowledge of chemicals used at well sites one important component of 
understanding and addressing fracturing risks.  
In response to public concerns about the known and unknown risks of drilling and 
fracturing,10 a growing number of states have required operators to disclose the type and 
quantity of chemicals used at fractured well sites.11 Industry’s involvement in driving and 
shaping these state regulations offers interesting initial lessons in public-private efforts at 
regulatory reform in drilling and fracturing,12 and this Essay briefly explores this trend. 
Part I describes weak federal disclosure requirements, which, in part, drove public 
demands for change. Part II identifies public-private efforts to form a voluntary chemical 
disclosure website and explores state laws mandating disclosure—many of which require 
or allow disclosure through the website. Having identified this core public-private 
development, Part III describes other efforts, often instigated by coalitions of state 
regulators and industry members, to identify and respond to the risks of shale gas and oil 
development. Finally, Part IV draws from the literatures of new governance and 
voluntary industry behavior to analyze how industry might both inspire and constrain 
future substantive regulatory change, identifying both positive and negative lessons from 
the public-private experiment so far.  
I. Federal Disclosure Laws 
Slickwater fracturing—a now-common technique that injects water and chemicals 
down wells at high pressure—has driven both oil and gas development and demands for 
information about the chemicals used in this development. Existing federal informational 
disclosure requirements for oil and gas production are weak, however. The Occupational 
Safety and Health Act and Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
require operators to keep material safety data sheets for chemicals on their sites;13 these 
                                                                                                                                                       
and some of the initial literature on risk, and highlighting concerns in addition to the environmental 
impacts of fracturing chemicals).  
8 See, e.g., id.; Rozell & Reaven, supra note 4. 
9 See, e.g., Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, EPA Region III, Adm’r, to Michael Krancer, Acting Sec’y, 
Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region03/marcellus_shale/pdf/letter/krancer-letter5-12-11.pdf. (expressing continuing 
concerns about inadequately-treated wastewater from fracturing).   
10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-732, OIL AND GAS: INFORMATION ON SHALE 
RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS 4 (2012) (concluding 
that risks cannot currently be quantified due to a lack of adequate scientific information). 
11 See infra notes 26–40.  
12 This paper does not fully explore the new governance and self-regulatory implications of disclosure 
laws. Rather, it provides a brief introduction to industry initiatives in drilling and fracturing and 
simultaneous government responses and very briefly addresses these theoretical areas.  
13 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 §§ 311–312, 42 U.S.C. 
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sheets describe the chemicals on site and their effects. Under federal law, operators also 
must provide these sheets to local emergency planning coordinators.14 The public benefit 
of these laws, however, is limited: curious citizens would often have to physically travel 
to a well site or local emergency agency to gain access to the sheets, and, more 
importantly, operators can claim trade secret status for these chemicals, thus potentially 
blocking public access.15 
As fracturing has become more common, and environmental and health concerns 
have expanded, the federal government has begun to respond. As part of a national study 
of the effects of fracturing on drinking water, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) demanded chemical information from the largest U.S. fracturing companies.16 In 
its recent progress report on the study, the agency indicates that it has received chemical 
information from nine companies and obtained additional information from 12,000 
voluntary “well-specific chemical disclosures” on FracFocus.17 The Agency also 
requested information from several major operators in Pennsylvania about the quantity of 
wastewater generated from drilling and fracturing and how the operators treated, 
recycled, and or disposed of it.18 Several federal senators and representatives, in turn, 
proposed disclosure requirements as part of a “FRACAct,” which died in committee.19 
The more meaningful efforts toward disclosing chemicals have occurred at the state and 
industry levels. Perhaps in part due to federal “threats,”20 growing public demands for 
                                                                                                                                                       
§§ 11021–11022 (2011). 
14 Id. at § 311(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(c)(1). 
15 Id. at §§ 312–313, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021–11022; 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (2010). See also Hannah 
Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUMB. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 1 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/1_Wiseman.pdf (describing the limits of federally-required disclosure). 
Although public records requests might be successful, states sometimes require on-site file reviews in 
order for citizens to obtain records. 
16 Letter from the Envtl. Prot. Agency to BJ Services et al. (Sept. 9, 2010), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/HFvolu 
ntaryinformationrequest.pdf.  
17 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON 
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2012), http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/pdfs/hf-
report20121214.pdf.  
18 See Enclosure 1, Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, Regional Adm’r, EPA Region III, to Freddie 
Kotek, Chief Exec. Officer, Atlas Res., L.L.C. (May 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region03/marcellus_shale/pdf/letter/enclosures5-12-11.pdf.  
19 Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s587/text; H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1084ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr1084ih.pdf.  
20 Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1844, 1849-51 (2011) (describing private threats, 
such as “a warning letter sent to a company,” and public threats, such as a “threat of either new 
rulemaking or enforcement of an existing rule,” and arguing that especially for industries “in a state of 
high uncertainty,” threats can be superior to rules in terms of forcing entities to act in the public interest 
without entrenching rules that could be “bad law”). But see id. at 1846–48 (surveying the literature on 
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information, and competitive pressure, these entities took the lead in expanding the 
disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulically fractured wells.  
II. Public and Private Efforts Toward Disclosure  
One of the first major steps toward disclosure of the chemicals used at each well 
site is a website called FracFocus.21 The Ground Water Protection Council (GWPC)—a 
501(c)(6) organization comprised of state oil and gas and environmental 
administrators22—worked with energy companies to fund, develop, and operate this 
website.23 On FracFocus, energy companies voluntarily disclose the type and quantity of 
chemicals that they use at each well site, and more than 200 oil and gas companies have 
registered more than 27,000 well sites.24 Curious investigators can click on each site to 
reveal a list of the specific chemicals used at that well.25  
As voluntary disclosure has expanded, so, too, has regulation of disclosure. From 
2010 through 2012, Arkansas,26 Colorado,27 Louisiana,28 Michigan,29 Mississippi,30 
Montana,31 New Mexico,32 New York,33 North Dakota,34 Ohio,35 Oklahoma,36 
                                                                                                                                                       
threats and noting that it largely views threats as negative). 
21 FRACFOCUS CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, http://fracfocus.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2012) 
[hereinafter FRACFOCUS].  
22 About Us, GROUNDWATER PROT. COUNCIL, http://www.gwpc.org/about-us (last visited Nov. 24, 
2012).  
23 FRACFOCUS, supra note 21 (showing the Ground Water Protection Council and the Interstate Oil 
and Gas Compact Commission—which receives industry funding—as holders of the website copyright 
and as website sponsors).  
24 About Us, FRACFOCUS CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, http://fracfocus.org/welcome (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2012).  
25 Well Map, FRACFOCUS CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, 
http://www.fracfocusdata.org/fracfocusfind/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
26 178 ARK. CODE R. § B-19(k) (LexisNexis 2012), available at 
http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/onlinedata/forms/rules%20and%20regulations.pdf (showing new rule 
effective January 15, 2011). 
27 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A (Westlaw 2012) (applying to “hydraulic fracturing treatments 
performed on or after April 1, 2012”). 
28 LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX, § 118(C)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (promulgated October 2011).  
29 MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, SUPERVISOR OF WELLS INSTRUCTION 1-2011 3 (2011), 
available at www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/SI_1-2011_353936_7.pdf. 
30 Miss. Sec’y of State, Rule 1.26 Requirements for Hydraulic Fracture Stimulation—Report of 
Shooting or Treating, http://www.sos.ms.gov/ACProposed/00018951b.pdf.  
31 MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1015(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
32 Proposed, N.M. CODE R. 19.15.16.18 (2011), available at 
http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/documents/201111-2OCDModifications.pdf; Gabrielle A. Gerholt, 
N.M Oil Conservation Div., Updated Information on NM Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Form, INDEP. 
PETROL. ASS’N OF N.M, http://www.ipanm.org/article.php/OCD_HF_Disclosure (last visited June 18, 
2012) (indicating that rules have been finalized).  
33 N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC 
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Pennsylvania,37 Texas,38 West Virginia,39 and Wyoming40 all updated, released, or 
proposed new statutes, agency directives, or regulations to require basic chemical 
disclosure. Nearly all of these laws require post-fracturing disclosure of the identity of 
chemicals used at well sites, a description of the quantity of each chemical used, and, 
often, a description of the quantity of water used.41 Several of the laws provide that 
operators may either disclose information by submitting a form to the state oil and gas or 
environmental agency or by showing that they have submitted to FracFocus.org or other 
websites approved by the state.42 North Dakota offers FracFocus as the sole means of 
disclosure and requires, within sixty days after fracturing, disclosure of all information 
“made viewable” by that website,43 whereas Oklahoma allows submission on FracFocus 
or to the state oil and gas agency, which then posts on FracFocus.44 
States are not simply incorporating FracFocus disclosure within public 
regulations; instead, they also appear to be modifying initial public-private efforts at 
disclosure. Colorado, for example, provides that if by 2013 FracFocus “does not allow 
the Commission staff and the public to sort the registry for Colorado information by 
geographic area, ingredient, chemical abstract service number, time period, and [well] 
operator” or “[t]here is no reasonable assurance that the registry will allow for such 
searches,”45 then operators must use electronic forms created by the Colorado Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission.46 
                                                                                                                                                       
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING PROGRAM 8-30 to -31 
(2011), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf (proposed—not yet finalized). 
34 N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-27.1(2)(i) (Westlaw 2012) (effective April 1, 2012).  
35 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.10 (Westlaw 2012).  
36 OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-10 (Westlaw 2012) (effective July 2012), available at 
http://www.occeweb.com/rules/Web%20Ready%20Ch10%20FY13%2007-01-12%20searchable.pdf.  
37 58 PA. STAT. § 3222(b.1)(1)(i) (Westlaw 2012).  
38 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(2)(A)(ix)–(xi) (Westlaw 2012).  
39 W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-7 (Westlaw 2012).  
40 55-3 WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis 2012). Note that this is not an exhaustive list. Other states 
also may have recently updated their disclosure laws. For a helpful recent summary, see BRANDON J. 
MURRILL & ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42461, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: CHEMICAL 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42461.pdf. 
41 See sources cited supra notes 29–40. See also Hannah Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of 
Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing 88–89, tbl.7a (Univ. of Tulsa Legal Studies, 
Research Paper No. 11, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953547 
(describing the contents of the disclosure requirements).  
42 See, e.g. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX, § 118(C)(4) (Westlaw 2012); MONT. ADMIN. R. 
36.22.1015(4) (Westlaw 2012); Miss. Sec’y of State, supra note 30. See also FRACFOCUS, supra note 21 
(showing a total of eight states that allow disclosure through FracFocus).  
43 See N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-27.1(2)(i) (Westlaw 2012). 
44 OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 165:10-3-10(b) (effective July 2012). 
45 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2012).  
46 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(3)(B) (Westlaw 2012).  
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The combination of voluntary industry disclosure and an expanding array of state 
disclosure laws—some of which are encouraging further innovation on the voluntary 
disclosure site—is promising. Nevertheless, some challenges remain. First, states 
consistently allow operators to claim that their chemicals retain trade secret protection 
and therefore should not be disclosed;47 the federal laws allow the same claim.48 It 
appears that only Texas has provided an appeal mechanism for trade secret claims—
allowing surface owners near wells and certain state agencies to contest secrecy.49 In a 
potentially more problematic development, states might view informational requirements 
as adequately addressing the new risks posed by higher levels of drilling and fracturing.50 
Comprehensive modifications of oil and gas regulations in some states, and the emerging 
literature on risks,51 suggest that informational requirements will not be adequate, yet 
they could provide a false sense of security to regulators.  
III. Other Private and Public-Private Efforts to Respond to Environmental 
Concerns  
Perhaps in part due to the wave of disclosure, which could incentivize industry to 
reduce its environmental impacts,52 private and quasi-private actors have begun to take 
                                                
47 See Wiseman & Gradijan, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.7b. But see W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-7 (Westlaw 
2012). (appearing to not allow trade secret claims by simply requiring operators to submit “[a] listing of 
anticipated additives that may be used” and a “listing of the additives actually used”). I am grateful to 
Professor Keith Hall for flagging the West Virginia omission in a conversation on January 5, 2013.  
48 See Wiseman, supra note 15. 
49 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(4), (f)(1)(Westlaw 2012). 
50 Three shale gas states, including Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, have implemented disclosure 
requirements yet few other revisions. This may be changing, however. Oklahoma is considering revisions 
to regulations in its “five-year strategic plan.” STRONGER, OKLAHOMA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
STATE REVIEW 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/Final%20Report%20of%20OK%20HF%20Review%201-19-
2011.pdf. Texas is considering relatively comprehensive revisions. See Memorandum from Cristina Self, 
Attorney, Office of Gen. Counsel, to Barry Smitherman, David Porter, and Buddy Garcia, Chairman and 
Comm’rs, R.R. Comm’n of Tex. (Aug. 21, 2012), www.rrc.state.tx.us/rules/prop-amend-3-13-Aug21-
2012.pdf.  
51 See, e.g., Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Associated with Natural Gas 
Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 1382 (2012), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01757.x/pdf (describing the total potential 
volume of spills from fracturing and drilling in the Marcellus); Wiseman, supra note 5, at 36–38 
(describing spill incidents). 
52 There is a rich literature on how information disclosure requirements, or voluntary disclosure, 
encourages or fails to incentivize improved substantive performance, which I only touch upon in passing 
here. See, e.g., David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 31 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,773 (2001) (providing a literature review); David W. Case, Corporate Environmental 
Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 
385–86 (2005) (noting disagreement as to whether disclosure programs such as the Toxic Release 
Inventory—which requires certain industries to annually report their toxic emissions—lead to better 
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other steps to address concerns associated with the use of chemicals in tight oil and gas 
development. These efforts have been both informational and substantive.  
On the informational end, several organizations have enhanced efforts to compare 
and describe the substance of state oil and gas regulations, including regulation to prevent 
contamination of water with drilling or fracturing chemicals. The GWPC published a 
white paper for the Department of Energy addressing state regulations that protect 
groundwater, including requirements for casing (lining) wells and properly cementing the 
casing.53 It also operates a Risk Based Data Management System, in which “[m]ore than 
twenty-two regulatory agencies . . . [track] oil, gas, injection well, and source water 
protection activities.”54 Further, the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission 
(IOGCC)—a group of state and international representatives that is Congressionally-
commissioned but receives some industry funding55—has a website called 
“Groundwork,” which allows viewers to compare state oil and gas laws.56 FracFocus, 
operated by both the GWPC and the IOGCC, also contains some state regulations and 
updates on recent regulatory changes, as well as state agency contact information.57 In 
one of the most comprehensive informational efforts to date, the Intermountain Oil and 
Gas Project—a partnership between the University of Colorado Law School and a 
number of NGOs, academic groups, and industry actors58—collects state and federal 
                                                                                                                                                       
environmental performance, but noting general agreement that TRI reporting “has induced significant 
voluntary reductions in covered releases well below levels otherwise required by existing command-and-
control regulation” and has incentivized industry to periodically submit reports that describe all 
environmental performance in one document); id. at 381, n. 11 (citing to other sources); Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor 
to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 287 (2001) (noting that “[g]overnment regulation has long 
mandated information disclosure as a regulatory device” but that the TRI requires disclosure of 
“environmental performance of those parties most directly responsible for significant environmental 
impacts” and has been successful). 
53 GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO 
PROTECT WATER RESOURCES (2009), available at 
http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/state_oil_and_gas_regula”tions_designed_to_protect_water_resou
rces_0.pdf (prepared for DOE).  
54 Risk Based Data Management System, GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, 
http://www.gwpc.org/programs/rbdms (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
55 2012 Annual Meeting, INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, 
http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/sanantonio (last visited Nov. 25, 2012) (showing various energy companies 
as 2012 annual meeting sponsors); Member States, INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, 
http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/member-states (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
56 Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Comm’n, GROUNDWORK, http://groundwork.iogcc.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2012). 
57 Regulations by State, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/regulations-state (last visited Nov. 25, 
2012).  
58 Further Research, INTERMOUNTAIN OIL AND GAS PROJECT, 
http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/resources/links.php (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (listing project partners 
and resources). 
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regulations.59 
These informational developments are important: because states currently have the 
primary responsibility for regulating oil and gas development, better information sharing 
is necessary if an effective laboratory of the states is to emerge in lieu of federal 
regulation. States and stakeholders must be aware of the substantial variations in 
regulation that exist,60 and they must better understand how the “leader” states have 
developed new regulations to reduce risks. None of the existing regulatory information-
sharing efforts, however, provide a comprehensive database that allows users to review 
and compare regulations among all states either by regulatory subject matter or state.61  
Several of the private-public documents and websites comparing or describing 
information about regulation also contain normative statements about the “best” level of 
regulation or the importance of oil and gas development. The GWPC’s document 
comparing state regulations concludes that “[s]tate oil and gas regulations are adequately 
designed to directly protect water resources.”62 Separately, the GWPC also has issued a 
resolution opposing federal regulation of the fracturing process.63 The IOGCC’s 
information page on state regulations, in turn, contains a link stating: “Why 
Environmentalists Should Support Oil Exploration in Alaska’s Arctic Waters.”64 These 
normative statements detract from the value of the information provided, threatening to 
turn away certain users and, in some cases, potentially mis-portray the effectiveness of 
regulation based on the organization’s political mission. The same risk, of course, 
attaches to nongovernmental organization (NGO) websites that describe state regulations 
and tend to oppose oil and gas development within these same descriptive efforts.65  
Some public-private efforts have moved beyond informational initiatives: several 
nonprofits and quasi-private groups recommend or suggest specific types of regulation to 
reduce the risks of drilling and fracturing and, in some cases, these proposals become part 
of regulation. Through the IOGCC charter, states historically agreed to pass basic 
regulations to prevent oil and gas waste in the production process and basic safety and 
environmental problems, including regulations to prevent excessive fire hazards at oil and 
                                                
59 Hydraulic Fracturing, INTERMOUNTAIN OIL AND GAS PROJECT, 
http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/resources/fracing.php (last visited Dec. 11, 2012).  
60 See Wiseman & Gradijan, supra note 41 (describing variations).  
61 For an initial effort to provide this type of comparison, see Wiseman & Gradijan, supra note 41, 
comparing regulations by subject matter for fifteen states in tables throughout the document. 
62 GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 7.  
63 GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 03-5: REQUESTING LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION 
OF THE DEFINITION OF “UNDERGROUND INJECTION” IN THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (2003), 
http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/Res-03-5.pdf.  
64 Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Comm’n, supra note 56.  
65 See, e.g., Halliburton Loophole, EARTHWORKS, 
http://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/inadequate_regulation_of_hydraulic_fracturing (last 
updated Nov. 25, 2012).  
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gas sites and conserving oil and gas.66 And under a more modern initiative, the GWPC 
has advocated against the use of diesel fuel in fracturing,67 although the EPA, which has 
rare authority in this area, has not banned it.68 The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board’s 
Natural Gas Subcommittee, convened by the Secretary of Energy and including 
professors, environmental group representatives, and energy research groups,69 similarly 
recommended banning the use of diesel in fracturing and suggested a number of other 
needed regulatory improvements in two reports issued in 2011.70 
The State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations 
(STRONGER)—a collaboration of state agency members, environmental NGOs, and 
industry representatives71—has larger sets of guidelines that encourage the proper 
disposal of oil and gas wastes.72 Working from these guidelines, the organization 
voluntarily reviews state oil and gas regulatory programs to make recommendations for 
improvements.73 The organization recently updated its guidelines to include fracturing-
specific standards74 and has reviewed a number of state hydraulic fracturing programs.75 
The organization often provides recommendations for substantive regulatory change after 
its review. In Louisiana, for example, STRONGER noted that the state lacked specific 
                                                
66 See Interstate Oil and Gas Commission Charter, INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT 
COMMISSION, http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/charter (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
67 GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 02-2: CONCERNING THE USE OF DIESEL FUEL IN 
FRACTURING FLUIDS IN UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER (2002), 
http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/Res-02-2.pdf.  
68 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR OIL AND GAS HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
ACTIVITIES USING DIESEL FUELS – DRAFT: UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL PROGRAM GUIDANCE # 
84 (2012), 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hfdieselfuelsguidance508.pd
f. But see Mike L. Krancer, Sec’y., Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Hydraulic Fracturing: Facts, History, 
Context and Perspective, Presentation at the American Bar Association Section of Environment, Energy, 
and Resources, 20th Section Fall Meeting 5–6 (Oct. 13, 2012) (arguing that the EPA has gone too far in 
regulating fracturing with diesel). 
69 Members of the Subcommittee, NAT. GAS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY 
ADVISORY BOARD, http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/aboutus/members.html.  
70 SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE 90-DAY REPORT 24–
25 (2011), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/081811_90_day_report_final.pdf; SEC’Y OF 
ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE SECOND NINETY DAY REPORT 4, 17 
(2011), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/111811_final_report.pdf.  
71 Our Team, STRONGER, http://www.strongerinc.org/content/voting-members (last visited Nov. 25, 
2012).  
72 STRONGER Guidelines, STRONGER, http://www.strongerinc.org/stronger-guidelines (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2012). 
73 State Reviews, STRONGER, http://www.strongerinc.org/process (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
74 Memorandum from the STRONGER Board to Pers. Interested in the Hydraulic Fracturing 
Guidelines (Feb. 8, 2010), 
http://67.20.79.30/sites/all/themes/stronger02/downloads/HF%20Guideline%20Web%20posting.pdf.  
75 Past Reviews, STRONGER, http://www.strongerinc.org/past-reviews (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).  
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standards for the cementing of liners into wellbores that would be fractured and thus 
would experience higher pressures inside the well.76 Adequate cementing of liners into 
the well is necessary to prevent wells from leaking oil, gas, or other substances into 
groundwater, but so far, the state has only updated its disclosure requirements in response 
to the STONGER review.77 The American Petroleum Institute also has a variety of 
drilling and fracturing standards, best management practices, and guidelines78 that some 
states have selectively incorporated into regulation,79 and the Society of Petroleum 
Engineers has partnered with industry, government officials, and environmental groups to 
identify the risks of fracturing through organized “summits” of experts.80 The GWPC has 
similarly organized forums on identifying risks and developing best practices in 
fracturing,81 
These private and quasi-private efforts of course fail to address all of the potential 
risks of tight oil and gas development. Their guidelines, resolutions, and summits do not 
cover all of the chemicals used in drilling and fracturing, and they may miss or ignore 
many other relevant stages of well development.82 Further, even for the risks identified 
through private and quasi-private initiatives, regulators have not always responded.83  
In some cases, deficiencies in public-private efforts to encourage better regulation 
                                                
76 STRONGER, LOUISIANA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 12 (2011), available at 
http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/haynesville_shale/071311_stronger_review.pdf (“The review team 
recommends that the Office of Conservation develop casing standards to meet anticipated pressures and 
protect other resources . . . .”). 
77 See DNR Office of Conservation Adopts New Regulation for Hydraulic Fracture Operations in 
Louisiana, LA. DEPARTMENT OF NAT. RESOURCES (Oct. 20, 2011) (showing that the new rule requires 
operators to acquire a work permit and disclose chemicals and that the rule was recommended in a 
STRONGER review); See also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. XIX, § 118 (Westlaw 2012). 
78 See AM. PETROL. INST., OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE/BEST PRACTICES ON HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING, http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/Hydraulic_Fracturing_InfoSheet.pdf 
(pointing readers to several API documents containing guidelines and standards); API - Drilling 
Collection, IHS, http://www.ihs.com/products/industry-standards/org/api/drilling/index.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2012) (listing documents containing numerous drilling standards and recommended practices). 
79 See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.10(P) (Westlaw 2012) (requiring API Class A cement); 25 PA. 
CODE § 78.85 (2011) (requiring surface casing cement “that meets or exceeds the ASTM International C 
150, Type I, II or III Standard or API Specification 10”); W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-11.5 (requiring 
“American Petroleum Institute Class A Ordinary Portland cement”); WYO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION 
COMM’N, GUIDELINE FOR SPILL CLEANUP (2002), available at http://wogcc.state.wy.us/craig/spill.htm 
(requiring operators to follow API’s “contaminated soil remediation ranking system” for certain spills).  
80 SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, WHITE PAPER ON SPE SUMMIT ON HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1, 5–6 
(2011). 
81 See, e.g., Two National Water Events... ONE GREAT LOCATION!, GROUND WATER PROT. 
COUNCIL, http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/events/AF12_Agenda_Dev_0917.pdf (last visited Nov. 
25, 2012) (agenda for an industry-sponsored event, showing best practices panels).  
82 See Wiseman, supra note 51.  
83 See generally Wiseman, supra note 5 (arguing that regulatory responses to certain risks have been 
inadequate).  
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may be offset by industry efforts at self-regulation. The American Petroleum Institute’s 
(API) detailed guidelines84 for drilling and fracturing may be very effective if 
consistently followed, for example. Some companies are also commencing substantive 
initiatives to use fewer toxic chemicals in fracturing, which may result from efforts to 
improve public image85 and save money.86 The program of one large energy actor “calls 
for the elimination of any additive not critical to the successful completion of the well” 
and “determines if greener alternatives are available for all essential additives.”87 Other 
companies have developed “low-footprint” fracturing operations that use less surface area 
and have implemented zero spill technology to avoid surface pollution during drilling and 
fracturing.88 
All of these public-private efforts toward sharing regulatory information, 
suggesting better regulation, and developing industry best-practices are valuable but may 
fail to address all of the risks. Substantive efforts to self-regulate are voluntary, meaning 
that members may ignore best practices without penalty. These efforts also may be 
influenced by a strong interest, shared by industry and many state regulators, to keep 
                                                
84 AM. PETROL. INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OPERATIONS—WELL CONSTRUCTION AND 
INTEGRITY GUIDELINES (2009), available at 
http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/API_HF1.pdf; AM. PETROL. INST., WATER 
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (2010), available at 
http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/HF2_e1.pdf; AM. PETROL. INST., PRACTICES FOR 
MITIGATING SURFACE IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (2011), available at 
http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/HF3_e7.pdf.  
85 See supra note 52 for a discussion of the broader legal literature on whether information disclosure 
incentivizes better performance. For a literature review of profit incentives associated with greener 
products, which may lead to industry self-regulation and improved performance, see Susan Summers 
Raines & Aseem Prakash, Leadership Matters: Policy Entrepreneurship in Corporate Environmental 
Policy Making, 37 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 3, 6–7 (2005).  
86 See, e.g. Erica Gies, Race Is On to Clean Up Hydraulic Fracturing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/business/energy-environment/race-is-on-to-clean-up-hydraulic-
fracturing.html?src=recg (describing water as an emerging risk in the industry and how entrepreneurial 
firms have proposed less toxic fluids that could be more easily recycled at multiple wells).  
87 Green Frac, CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, http://www.chk.com/environment/drilling-and-
production/pages/green-frac.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). 
88 See James Slutz, President and Managing Dir., Global Energy Strategies, LLC, Presentation to the 
Asan Institute for Policy Studies (Jan, 11, 2013) (on file with Author) (describing Halliburton’s efforts to 
limit the number of surface tanks and other equipment needed and to increase their density and describing 
zero spill technologies such as “Kelly Kan”); Press Release, Halliburton, El Paso and Halliburton Pioneer 
the First Natural Gas Completion Using All Current Cleansuite™ “Green Technologies” for Hydraulic 
Fracturing and Water treatment (May 2, 2011), 
http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press_release/2011/corpnws_050211_1.html?SRC=El
PasoandHalliburton; HALLIBURTON, MANUFACTURING APPROACH TO FRACTURING LIMITS 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 22 (2006), 
http://www.halliburton.com/public/pe/contents/Papers_and_Articles/web/A_through_P/FracFactory.pdf 
(noting techniques such as drilling wells in clusters and installing portable fracturing technologies in 
order to reduce environmental impact).  
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regulation at the state level.89 And in the case of industry efforts, profit motives could 
potentially dampen best practices aimed to reduce environmental risks. Despite all of 
these drawbacks, public-private efforts beyond chemical disclosure in tight oil and gas 
development seem to be expanding the regulatory information available to the public, 
reducing the use of certain chemicals, and potentially lowering certain development risks.  
IV. Lessons for Future Fracturing Regulation 
The industry’s information-based and substantive efforts in the drilling and 
fracturing area, coupled with formal public requirements, are interesting variations on 
several familiar themes, including new governance and voluntary improvement of 
environmental performance. This Part briefly explores how the evolution of disclosure 
laws and some substantive standards in drilling and fracturing may fit within these 
themes, and how further improvements will be needed to ensure effective regulation of 
oil and gas development through a combination of public and private controls.  
A. Collaborative Governance  
A broad environmental literature, and ever-growing scholarship within the field of 
new governance, has noted a move away from public law as we traditionally understand 
it. Whereas scholars previously envisioned legislatures and agencies implementing top-
down, mandatory statutes and regulations to control various risks, many now understand 
the regulatory process as a more complex endeavor, involving multiple stakeholders in 
forming and implementing regulation. As Professor Bradley Karkkainen explains, new 
governance moves us “away from the familiar model of command-style, fixed-rule 
regulation by administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, 
multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving.”90 This builds from, among other foundations, 
Jody Freeman’s model of collaborative governance, which requires a “problem-solving 
orientation” focused on “solving regulatory problems; “[p]articipation by interested and 
affected parties in all stages of the decisionmaking process”; a view of rules as 
temporary, not fixed solutions; accountability of all parties to each other, including public 
and private parties; and a flexible agency that convenes negotiations among stakeholders 
and developers solutions based on participant contributions.91  
In the environmental realm, one of the most common examples of new governance 
is Project XL, in which industry actors could avoid federal environmental regulation by 
showing that they had implemented alternative methods to achieve superior 
environmental protection.92 Other examples come from rulemaking rather than rule 
                                                
89 See Wiseman, supra note 51.  
90 Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” In Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as 
Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473 (2004).  
91 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 22 
(1997). 
92 See Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and the Special Case: The EPA’s Untold Success Story, 26 
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application. Through negotiated rulemaking, or reg-neg, agencies involve regulated 
actors and concerned parties more closely in the rule drafting process, often arriving at 
consensus standards.93 Stakeholders share information about actual risks and industry’s 
approaches to them, debate the merits of these approaches, and, if successful, arrive at a 
rule that better encompasses genuine concerns and does so in an effective and cost-
efficient manner.94 
Public-private efforts to improve environmental performance in drilling and 
fracturing exhibit several traits of potentially successful collaborative governance 
strategies. Industry’s FracFocus website appears to have influenced the content of many 
state disclosure rules; even if formal negotiated rulemaking did not occur within these 
rulemaking processes,95 state environmental and oil and gas agencies clearly took into 
account the FracFocus disclosure requirements and often incorporated them into 
disclosure requirements. This is important, in that agencies at least indirectly considered 
regulated actors’ views about reasonable disclosure and, perhaps, what industry believed 
was most effective at informing the public.96 In enacting disclosure laws, some states also 
specifically addressed recommendations by STRONGER.97 Furthermore, many state 
disclosure rules are intentionally impermanent, with Colorado allowing disclosure on 
                                                                                                                                                       
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 223–25 (2001).  
93 Freeman, supra note 91, at 22–24. 
94 Freeman, supra note 91, at 50–52.  
95 More investigation into the decisionmaking processes behind agency disclosure rules will be 
required to determine the extent to which collaborative governance occurred, if at all. Many states 
engaged in traditional notice and comment rulemaking and held public hearings on proposed rules. See, 
e.g., Mont. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation Bd. of Oil & Gas, Transcript of Public Hearing (June 
23, 2011), http://bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/PDF/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20Rule%20Hearing06152011.pdf; 
Mont. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation Bd. of Oil & Gas, Written and E-mailed Public Comments, 
http://bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/PDF/CombinedComments.pdf; R.R Comm’n of Tex., 16 TAC Chapter 3-Oil and 
Gas Division, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/rules/signed-adopt-3-29-Dec13-2011.PDF (showing nine written 
comments from environmental groups and industry and describing additional comments from a public 
hearing).  
96 See, e.g. Apache Supports Full Disclosure of Hydraulic Fracturing Information, APACHE 
CORPORATION, http://www.apachecorp.com/News/Articles/View_Article.aspx?Article.ItemID=2554 (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2012) (suggesting that FracFocus was “designed to provide easy access by non-technical 
users”).  
97 See Hydraulic Fracture Stimulation Operations, 37 La. Reg. 3064 (Oct. 20, 2011) (codified at LA. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118), available at http://www.doa.louisiana.gov/osr/reg/1110/1110.pdf 
(introducing a rule with disclosure requirements for fracturing chemicals and pressures, indicating that “a 
review of Office of Conservation policies and regulations associated with the hydraulic fracturing process 
was conducted by the non-profit, multi-stakeholder organization, STRONGER, Inc. to assess the 
effectiveness and adequacy of current regulations. Their report . . . recommended some of the changes in 
this amendment.”); STRONGER, LOUISIANA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 14 (2011), 
available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/haynesville_shale/071311_stronger_review.pdf (“The 
review team recommends that reporting should include the identification of materials used, aggregate 
volumes of fracturing fluids and proppant used, and fracture pressures recorded.”).  
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FracFocus but only if the website eventually allows individuals to search by certain 
criteria.98  
Despite these promising developments, there are important limitations in states’ 
reliance on industry suggestions for disclosure. As introduced in Part II, all disclosure 
rules—with the exception of Texas (if appeals of trade secret status are successful), and 
possibly West Virginia99—appear to allow those reporting chemical use to retain trade 
secret status for chemicals,100 and industry actors that can hide the identity of certain 
toxic substances may have few incentives to stop using these substances. Further, in 
crafting disclosure regulations, states may have ignored other important information that 
should be disclosed but has not been prioritized by industry, such as the type of soil at the 
well site, whether the site is above an aquifer or near surface water, and other 
environmental indicators that would determine the impact of the chemical if it spilled or 
leaked from the well.101  
In the substantive realm, efforts by state regulators and industry to work together 
to identify risks, write guidelines, and propose regulatory changes have been impressive, 
although not comprehensive. Yet even agreed-upon suggestions for improved 
performance have not morphed into regulation in some cases, with the EPA rejecting the 
GWPC’s proposal to ban diesel in fracturing, for example.102 In sum, public-private 
efforts toward improving both information disclosure and drilling and fracturing practices 
have been important yet have occurred in a piecemeal fashion, and they are likely 
inadequate to fully address risks. More consistent efforts to compare gaps among states 
and regulatory change in response to suggestions from STRONGER, industry groups, 
scientists, and other stakeholders will be needed. 
B. Voluntary Improvement of Environmental Performance 
In another area of the literature that recognizes that command and control 
regulation is not in all cases the only means of achieving sound environmental 
performance, scholars have noted a variety of mechanisms that may drive industries to 
self-regulate or over-perform on a broad set of environmental measures. Professors 
Daniel Esty, Peter Appel, Dennis Hirsch and other environmental and administrative law 
scholars have pioneered this field, observing that sheer profit incentives,103 as well as 
                                                
98 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
99 See source cited supra note 39.  
100 See source cited supra note 47. 
101 FracFocus disclosures do not include this information. See, e.g., Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid 
Product Component Information Disclosure API Number 4212134065, Denton County (Sept. 14, 2011) 
(on file with author).  
102 See GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 67.  
103 See, e.g., Nicole Darnall et al., Sponsorship Matters: Assessing Business Participation in 
Government- and Industry-Sponsored Voluntary Environmental Programs, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 283, 284 (2009), available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~ndarnall/docs/sponsorship_matters.pdf 
(describing “voluntary environmental programs” under which “[i]n return for incurring private costs for 
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regulatory programs that encourage innovation, can inspire self-driven improvement. As 
Professor Appel notes, environmental problems are caused largely by corporate actors 
that generate externalities—many of which are diffuse and not immediately 
recognizable.104 Yet corporations, including management and stockholders, can benefit 
immensely from improvements in environmental performance, and the challenge lies in 
creating the right incentives to encourage voluntary improvements.105 Information 
disclosure regimes,106 or requirements for enhanced technological monitoring of 
pollution,107 could improve performance simply by embarrassing industry actors, or by 
creating better-informed regulation. Threats of regulation also may work by incentivizing 
industry to prove sound environmental performance and preempt the need for 
regulation,108 while some corporations may reduce pollution or other environmental 
harms in response to shareholder concerns—or at least pretend to take such efforts.109  
Industry actors, by voluntarily disclosing information about chemicals used at well 
sites, appear to have stepped up pressure on nonconforming actors, challenging them to 
follow the emerging norm of transparency. Industry—likely in part due to threats of 
regulation,110 and in part due to public and peer pressure111—has voluntarily disclosed the 
                                                                                                                                                       
adopting . . . beyond-compliance policies, organizations can receive benefits such as goodwill from the 
external stakeholders, enhanced reputation, and improved external relations”); DANIEL C. ESTY & 
ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO 
INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 3 (2006) (explaining that “leading 
companies have learned to manage environmental risks and costs as closely as they do other risks and 
costs” and have accordingly reduced “the risk to the whole enterprise”).  
104 Peter A. Appel, Improving Corporate Environmental Performance: Encouraging Sustainable 
Commerce through Regulatory and Other Governmental Action, (Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law, Research 
Paper No. 2011-27, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924808.  
105 See Dennis D. Hirsch, Green Business and the Importance of Reflexive Law: What Michael Porter 
Didn’t Say, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2010) (describing the importance of “reflexive law,” 
including “legal standards and regulatory policies that push private firms to: (1) internalize social goals 
(e.g., environmental performance goals) and adopt them as their own, and (2) creatively self-manage their 
operations so as better to achieve those goals” and providing examples, including requirements for 
“information disclosure, stakeholder involvement, and planning requirements”).  
106 See id.  
107 See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 
(2004) (explaining how enhanced technologies for sensing resource use and pollution can both improve 
decisionmaking and incentivize better industry performance); supra note 52 (identifying other prominent 
legal scholars who have argued that information incentivizes better performance). 
108 See Raines & Prakash, supra note 85 (summarizing the literature on firms’ “incentives to self-
regulate to forestall mandatory regulation”).  
109 See id.  
110 The GWPC, which helped to form FracFocus, has argued against federal regulation. Scott Kell, 
President, Ground Water Prot. Council, Statement to House Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral 
Resources (June 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ogsgeisapp2.pdf (arguing that “[a] one-size-fits-all 
federal program is not the most effective way to regulate in this area”). 
111 Many of the public demands for regulation of hydraulic fracturing have specifically addressed 
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chemicals that it uses at thousands of well sites112 and has initiated efforts to employ less 
toxic fracturing chemicals and other environmentally beneficial practices.113 And as 
discussed in Part II, many states have implemented mandatory disclosure regimes that 
rely on FracFocus. Under a metric that, in another context, Professor Karkkainen believes 
is important for enhancing substantive performance through regulation, the information 
collected allows direct comparison of environmental performance;114 chemicals used are 
reported in the same units of volume,115 and news reporters and other groups have begun 
to use the information to suggest areas where risk remains.116  
As shown by private and quasi-private efforts toward informational and 
substantive changes in tight sands and oil and gas development, not all private initiatives 
lead to regulatory change. In some cases, this may be acceptable both from a risk and an 
efficiency perspective. If all companies followed a full suite of best practices, in which an 
industry leader verified compliance, then regulation might not be necessary. Similarly, if 
governments converted every voluntary agency initiative, such as FracFocus, into 
regulation, they might stifle industry innovation.  
To the extent there remain risks from handling chemicals and engaging in the 
many stages of tight oil and gas development, however, public agencies need to become 
more proactive. In many cases, the oil and gas industry itself may be unaware of the risks 
as the scale of oil and gas drilling dramatically rises in certain regions and fracturing is 
used more frequently;117 this uncertainty118 will limit the effectiveness of self-regulation 
that might reduce the risk of pollution liability and other threats to a company’s value. 
States and the federal government, also operating under uncertainty, need to expand 
efforts to work collaboratively with stakeholders, including industry, scientists, and 
nonprofit groups to conduct risk assessments and identify regulatory needs. If borrowing 
from industry efforts to substantively improve performance, states must ensure that they 
                                                                                                                                                       
chemical disclosure. See, e.g., Mont. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation Bd. Of Oil & Gas, Written 
and E-mailed Public Comments, supra note 95, at 1 (“I want to know what is in the chemicals as they will 
end up in my food and water.”); id. at 2 (“The chemical information for any fracturing fluids used needs 
to be easily accessible by the public in a common area such as the Board of Oil and Gas Conservation 
website.”); id. at 4 (“We feel it is imperative that if there is to be any fracking in our vicinity there is full 
disclosure of chemicals being used in this process.”).  
112 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
113 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.  
114 Karkkainen, supra note 52, at 260–61.  
115 Reporting is in maximum ingredient concentration (% by mass). See supra note 101.  
116 See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Diesel Still Used to “Frack” Wells, FracFocus Data Show, E&E 
PUBLISHING, LLC. (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/08/17/1 (“Diesel fuel 
has been used to ‘frack’ at least 138 wells in the United States in the past year and a half, according to 
data filed by drillers with the FracFocus.org registry.”). 
117 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 10 (concluding that the risks cannot 
currently be quantified).  
118 See id.  
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are not boxed in by the approach chosen by industry. The solution first implemented 
often becomes the long-term solution, yet it may not be the best one. Although FracFocus 
encourages energy companies to disclose a variety of information types, for example—
from the volume of water used at each well to the names and types of chemicals—it does 
not have a space for describing the natural resources near the well site or soil conditions 
on the site, which could substantially influence the impact of a chemical spill.  
Finally, agencies that incorporate industry standards into regulation must modify 
these standards to incorporate the views of non-industry actors. Public regulations, as 
opposed to best practices, exist for several reasons: they balance a number of interests, 
including public demands for environmental and public health protection and industry 
demands for efficiency; they often incorporate scientific data and careful calculations of 
costs and benefits; and they are mandatory. Generally, public regulations encourage all 
members of an industry to act consistently and thus to achieve the overall goal of the 
regulation, such as a maximum level of contaminants in air or water. While industry often 
holds the most technical knowledge in oil and gas, and thus is a key actor within the 
regulatory process, it is not and should not be the only voice that influences regulation.  
Conclusion  
As tight oil and gas development continues its rapid march toward domination of 
the U.S. energy market, both industry and government actors—often working in 
concert—are responding in a variety of ways. This Essay has introduced several of the 
private and public-private efforts to address the risks of this development and appease 
public concerns. One of the most successful efforts to date has involved the expansion of 
chemical disclosure, with voluntary industry efforts morphing into state regulations that 
require disclosure through a public-private website.  
Similar initiatives have emerged in more substantive areas. Private and public-
private efforts to disseminate information about the content of state oil and gas 
regulations have provided useful, although incomplete, means of comparing regulatory 
content. Similar efforts to identify risk and propose improved regulation—although not 
always implemented—also appear to be somewhat successful. And finally, private best 
practices provide some industry self-regulation of risks.  
More action, both at the public and private levels and the grayer areas between 
them, will be needed to address the range of impacts introduced by a rapidly growing 
industrial practice. Local, state, and federal agencies implementing further change must 
account for and in some cases formalize the private progress already occurring, while 
recognizing that such action could disincentivize future industry efforts. At the same 
time, private actors seeking public acceptance of tight oil and gas would be wise to 
further improve information dissemination and show the extent to which industry actors 
follow the many best practices that already have been developed. Disclosure is a very 
important start, but much more collaborative work remains to be done.  
